The right to dissolve Parliament and its legal nature for Dr. Asaad Ghali Hamzha Date: 16/10/2022 | Views: 821

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The right to dissolve Parliament and its legal nature
Dr. Asaad Ghali Hamzha

The dissolution of the parliament is one of the measures contained in the constitutional document, the dissolution of the parliament is only a constitutional measure that shortens the legal period of the deputy of the parliament or one of its chambers, which is accompanied by the invitation and not by the result of new parliamentary elections, and the constitutional legislator aims to include the dissolution of the parliament in the constitution to achieve a set of goals or objectives aimed at reaching them , Which may lead in its entirety to the proper functioning of the constitutional and political work within the state, and thus the dissolution of the parliament is of great importance in the functioning of constitutional institutions and in the best interest of the state, because the constitution in the state aims to create the organization of the state and its institutions in order to achieve its sustainability, and even the dissolution of parliament is considered in some countries, such as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland , A means of identifying the trends of public opinion because of the latter's strong political power to change and modify the attitudes of parties with a ruling majority, and therefore the impact of this is evident on the policies that may be pursued by either legislative and executive branches. Thus, the people are indeed the sovereign in the State.
the Constitution of the State is the highest law in which it exists, and all authorities must abide by its provisions, and to preserve the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution, the Constitution itself provides for a set of sanctions that achieve that constitutional superiority.
However, these sanctions may blend their legal and political nature. Because the rules of the Constitution themselves contain this dual nature, which has been the subject of a difference in constitutional jurisprudence. From these proportionate sanctions and the nature of the subjects regulated by the Constitution, we find the dissolution of Parliament, which may be a sanction imposed by the popular will or according to the will of the government or may be imposed by the will of the constituent authority that draws up the Constitution. This is something that we tried to investigate in the constitution of Iraq for the year 2005, to find out the nature of this sanction that the constitution tried to create in harmony with the fact that the political system in Iraq is the parliamentary system.
There is no doubt that the dissolution of parliament raises multiple problems that arise through questions that the issue of dissolving parliament may raise in terms of the constitutional philosophy of organizing the dissolution, which relates to whether the dissolution of parliament is thus a constitutional sanction that can be imposed on the legislative authority if it moves away from the real representation of the people, especially under the current Iraqi constitution of 2005?
What is the nature of this sanction, is it a legal, political, or mixed sanction? These fundamental questions on the subject relate to others that precede them, which arise from the need to know the legal nature of the constitutional rules themselves, which have been the subject of divergent jurisprudential opinions, which have often centered on the element of sanction to which the legal rule is supposed to be accompanied.
If we examine the constitutional jurisprudence in the Constitution of Iraq of 2005, we find an urgent need for the Iraqi constitutional legislator to start regulating the provisions of the Council of Federation as the second constituent council of the federal legislative authority by article 48 of the Constitution, and not to leave its organization to the law issued by the House of Representatives. Because this is a constitutional fad that has no basis in the constitutional principles of the countries of the world, especially the federal ones.
On the one hand, and the other hand, the constitutional legislator must abolish the self-dissolution of the House of Representatives, where we believe that the text of Article (64/I) should be deleted, and the advanced text should read as follows:
The Prime Minister, after deliberation in the Council of Ministers, may dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. The President of the Republic shall issue a decree thereon if it is a cause.
The President of the Republic may, if necessary, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies by a reasoned presidential decree signed by the Prime Minister and the Ministers.
The Iraqi constitutional legislator must first regulate the provisions of the Council of Federation as the second council that constitutes the federal legislative authority by Article (48) of the Constitution, and not leave its organization to the law issued by the Council of Representatives. Because this is a constitutional heresy that has no basis in the constitutional principles of the countries of the world, especially the federal ones.
The constitutional legislator cancels the self-dissolution of the House of Representatives, where we believe that the text of Article (64/I) should be deleted, and the advanced text shall read as follows:
The Prime Minister, after deliberation in the Council of Ministers, may dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. The President of the Republic shall issue a decree thereon if it is a cause.
The President of the Republic may, if necessary, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies by a reasoned presidential decree signed by the Prime Minister and the Ministers.
And to stay away from dissolving the House of Representatives during the voting period on confidence in the Prime Minister. The proposed text could thus strike a kind of balance between the two powers and guarantee the role of arbitration to the President of the Republic. In addition, it would bring about the idea of constitutionally regulated sanctions for the solution.
Lest the executive branch the penalty of dissolution on its legislative counterpart, we believe that a new paragraph should be added to the text of Article (61/VI) read as follows: (c) The President of the Republic may not dissolve the Chamber of Deputies during the period of his accountability for one of the advanced cases). The cases of accountability of the President of the Republic by the Constitution are perjury in the constitutional oath violation of the Constitution.
Thus, we will create a kind of protection for the Parliament when it exercises its oversight role over the executive branch, with the urgency of our proposal regarding Article (63/III) above.
The form of automatic dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies may be adopted in the following cases:
1. Add to the text of Article (70) item (III) which reads as follows: "If the President of the Republic cannot be elected in the second ballot, the Chamber of Deputies shall be dissolved, and the elections shall be held within a period not exceeding thirty days.
2. In addition to the text of Article (76), clause (VI) reads as follows: (VI) If the House of Representatives cannot grant confidence to the Council of Ministers and the Ministerial Platform within the periods stipulated above, the Chamber of Deputies shall be dissolved, and elections shall be held within a period not exceeding thirty days. The new Council shall meet within a period of ten days from the date of the announcement of the results of the elections.