world. III and , ..... une jurisdiction to decide cases of by the personal status for all Christians has been assigned to the "Court the personal Status" which is a civil court. The applicable law is of Personal Status" which is a civil court. The applicable law is the of Personal Status which is to say the Proglamation of 1917 supplemented by the the 32, 1947, that is to say the Proclamation of 1917 supplemented by the he 132, 1947, that is to say the religious heads of the minorities. r all he his 2 — CUSTOM 1951 When we talk of custom as a source of law, we mean legal legisle custom. 'Legal custom' is distinct from other social customs in that ns in its obligatory sanction is complete and uniform. sow Although custom is an important source of law in early times, are its importance continuously diminishes as the legal system grows. However, it is a misunderstanding of the evolution of law and the ation ecem conditions of primitive societies to regard customs merely as 25 (A 'positive morality' until they have been expressly ratified by some determinate law-making authority. The great majority of cusm a toms are non-litiguous in origin, and their rise and observance for depend on de facto conduct and repitition. reli The importance of custom as a source of law is not entirely re n confined to the early stages of social growth; in all civilized juris-COD prudence it has always been recognized as greatly influencing the Oriti development of legal institutions. Roman law, though its theory risti in this respect was not entirely clear or consistent, attributed an Tul important function to custom, constantly recognizing its effect ustic both in substantive and adjective law, though assigning to it a W S secondary position as compared with the supreme legislative instictic rument of the imperial regime. re jurisprudence the Historical School of Savigny In modern th ound in custom the true source of all law, deriving it from the alit 'common consciousness of the people'.) We have seen that in the diligent. 1900 obstrare g Coherant, Cohesile-nerel snowger g Coherant, CohesileLegal Custom / Fourt and the short hay to far ledged any the Country have a cknowing only in so seview of this School law is valid and just only in so se known and embodies in concrete forms the inherent known and embodies in concrete forms to govern of the community of the community which it purports to attribute modification for it seems impossible to attribute all general conviction among the community of their neg ness, and appropriateness. Customs are often the pro a widespread conviction, but of the convenience or in ruling class ruling class which imposes its will on the majority Many are purely legal in origin, andmany are the resident portions and influence the resident portions and the resident portions are the resident po ed influences which cannot be called peculiary popular al.

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Kinds of Custom. All custom which has the force be of two kinds, which are essentially distinct in the operation. The first kind is (legal custom) which is operative per se as a binding rule of law, independent agreement on the part of those subject to it. The  $se_{c_{0m}}$ (conventional) custom, which is the one operating only ny through the medium of agreements whereby it is acce is adopted in individual instances as conventional law bettly parties. The authority of the former is absute, that of ind is conditional on its acceptance and imporation in athe between the parties. In the language of hish law the ter tom is more commonly confined to legal com exclusive ent conventional custom is distinguished as we. The distinguished drawn, however, between the terms 'cutal and 'usage hile in popular speech are synonymous, is no means un so observed even by lawyers. In Arabic, the terms are hich terchangeably, but some writers follow stern jurist sally French jurists draw distinction dis 'la coutume' (custom) and 'l'usage' (usage he former mon practice regarded as the source of the former mon practice as give if law, where the source as give it law, where the source of the source o mon practice regarded as the latter is confined to such practice as give of law, who come intended their relations of an imple the latter is confined to such practice as an imple that the parties intended their relations of an imple the governed by it and have relied upon the another atio understate by

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