The world is no longer merely a “small village,” as it was recently described; rather, it now stands at a critical juncture marked by apprehension toward the immense development occurring across all fields. From the contemporary perspective, such development has dismantled geographical, political, and even social and familial boundaries. Consequently, family-related matters have entered a new realm as a result of unprecedented advances in communications, smart programming, and artificial intelligence, giving rise to a society that may aptly be described as an “informational homeland,” which has permeated all aspects of life, including the judiciary. The family sphere, traditionally governed by custom, religion, and local law, has become vulnerable to intrusion—if not already breached—such that what were once considered family secrets and private disputes have surfaced into the public domain, thereby entering the scope and reach of artificial intelligence. In light of the foregoing, several questions arise, most notably: Can a legal framework be established for artificial intelligence in the field of personal status cases? What is the evidentiary value and legal authority of artificial intelligence in matters of personal status? It is well established that personal status matters possess a degree of particularity that distinguishes them from other legal disputes. For this reason, the law has accorded them special treatment in recognition of their unique nature. The Civil Procedure Law No. 83 of 1969, in Book Four (Personal Status Courts and Their Procedures), provides in Article 299: “The following provisions shall apply to Sharia lawsuits; where no provision exists, the rules of procedure set forth in this Law shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the nature of Sharia lawsuits.” Likewise, the Evidence Law No. 107 of 1979, when addressing the scope of its application, stipulates in Article 11 (First): “Third: Non-financial matters relating to personal status, unless there is a specific Sharia evidence or a provision in the Personal Status Law that provides otherwise.” This indicates that both laws—the Civil Procedure Law and the Evidence Law—acknowledge the special nature of personal status matters. Accordingly, a number of Sharia-related issues are not governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law. For example, time limits for appeals are not absolute in cases of divorce and lineage, as the Court of Cassation may address them even if the appeal period has elapsed. In the field of evidence, a judgment of judicial separation may not be issued based on refusal to take an oath in the absence of the husband, even though the Evidence Law permits this as a general rule. Therefore, it is natural that the role of artificial intelligence in personal status matters should be limited. When discussing the role of artificial intelligence in personal status issues, it is useful to address it in relation to the stages of Sharia cases, beginning with the marriage contract. As is well known, the pillars of a marriage contract include offer and acceptance, their mutual correspondence, unity of session, the parties’ hearing and understanding of each other’s statements as constituting a marriage contract, and the presence of witnesses. An analysis of these pillars raises the question: what if the session is a virtual one? That is, the presence of the husband, wife, and witnesses in one location, while the judge is in another, with communication facilitated through artificial intelligence technologies. In this context, the United Arab Emirates launched an electronic service in 2017 known as “Smart Marriage,” whereby the spouses, witnesses, and guardian gather in one session at a location where a robot serves as a communication tool linking them to the judge in another session. The judge instructs them in the marriage formula, hears the witnesses via a screen, and subsequently orders the robot to print the contract. With regard to the formula of offer and acceptance, these elements are fulfilled, and attestation is achieved through the presence of the witnesses at the robot’s location with the spouses and their hearing of the statements. Accordingly, there appears to be no legal impediment to conducting the contract through this means, provided that certain requirements are met. These include linking the robot to a comprehensive national system that grants access to all relevant data of the parties, such as name, date of birth, religion, gender, and marital status, among others, as well as amending the relevant laws to align with technological developments. This approach would likewise apply to the issuance of other Sharia instruments, such as death certificates, inheritance inventories, guardianship deeds, trusteeship, and similar documents. As for case management, artificial intelligence plays a highly significant role, from the registration of the case to its conclusion. It may be utilized to file cases and schedule hearings according to the nature of each case. For instance, it may be directed to set expedited hearings for alimony cases or urgent matters, or to assign hearings consistent with the nature of the case, such as judicial separation cases, which often require deliberation and caution rather than haste. It may also be employed in issuing notifications, hearing witnesses at locations other than the courtroom, hearing parties remotely, or assisting in matters of expert evidence, among other functions. However, the most critical question remains: can artificial intelligence replace the judge? Can it adjudicate the substantive merits of cases by inputting the facts, claims, and defenses and then issuing a final judgment through a robotic system? A “smart judge” or artificial intelligence judge would entail a system independently adjudicating disputes by hearing claims, witnesses, and other evidence, examining the case in detail, and then rendering a judgment. It is well established in law and jurisprudence that adjudication, following the examination of evidence, involves complex mental processes and often incorporates principles of justice as a source of decision-making. Justice, in its simplest definition, is an inherent inner sense that intervenes to mitigate the rigidity and severity of legal rules. The judge weighs evidence, particularly personal testimony, by assessing witnesses both subjectively and objectively, as testimony is evaluated rather than merely counted. The judge may allow the party with weaker evidence to direct a decisive oath to the opposing party, or may on their own initiative administer a supplementary oath to a party with incomplete evidence. The judge may also discern the truthfulness or falsity of testimony through observation of certain indications or through examination of the witness. Furthermore, the law assigns the judge an active role in managing proceedings, assessing evidence, and deriving judicial presumptions from the case at hand, and may even exclude certain evidence or cases if they contravene public order or morals. Through these considerations and countless other procedures, the human judge examines and scrutinizes the evidence and the case as a whole, relying on intellectual reasoning, judicial intuition, and deeply rooted principles of justice inherent to human nature—qualities that cannot be replicated in machines. This is without addressing the Sharia conditions required of those who assume judicial office. Accordingly, there is no objection to relying on artificial intelligence in concluding contracts, issuing Sharia instruments in accordance with established regulations, and managing cases after amending the relevant laws. Such reliance would undoubtedly contribute to the expeditious resolution of cases, the delivery of rights to their rightful holders, and the reduction of procedural formalism. However, artificial intelligence cannot replace the human judge—at least in personal status cases. This position is reflected in the Electronic Signature and Electronic Transactions Law No. 78 of 2012, Article 3, Second Paragraph, which explicitly excludes personal status transactions from the scope of the law.